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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. INJURIES ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Close Proximity to Place of Employment
Workmen's compensation laws eliminate negligence as the
criterion for liability with respect to work-related injuries and
instead determine liability by the relationship that the injury has
to the employment. This relationship, described by the phrase
"arising out of and in the course of employment," is the basis for
liability.' The simplicity of this statement belies the difficulty of
identifying its true scope, as evidenced by the three 1978 cases
2
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court was required to de-
termine whether or not a particular injury fell within this mean-
ing.
In Skipper v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 3
the claimant was held entitled to compensation for injuries suf-
fered as the result of an assault by her supervisor. The claimant,
Pherebie Skipper, was employed by Southern Bell as a long dis-
tance telephone operator. She was subjected to constant and
unwarranted harassment by Gloria Thompson, a fellow employee
who held a superior position. On the day of the injury, Skipper,
who normally got off work at 11:00 p.m., was granted permission
to leave early. As she was preparing to leave the building in which
she worked, she was accosted by Thompson on a flight of stairs
that led to the street. Thompson criticized Skipper's job perform-
ance and told her that "she would never get anywhere" in her job.
Thompson concluded this tirade by slapping Skipper, which
caused Skipper to fall down the stairs and suffer injury.'
Among the issues presented to the supreme court were: (1)
did the assault arise out of Skipper's employment, and (2) did it
occur in the course of her employment? The court answered both
questions in the affirmative.5
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (1976). See generally S. HOROVrTZ, INJuRY AND DEATH
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 5 (1944).
2. McDaniel v. Bus Terminal Restaurant Mgmt. Corp., 271 S.C. 299, 247 S.E.2d 321
(1978); Skipper v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 271 S.C. 152, 246 S.E.2d 94 (1978);
Gregg v. Dorchester County School Sys., 270 S.C. 189, 241 S.E.2d 554 (1978).
3. 271 S.C. 152, 246 S.E.2d 94 (1978).
4. Id. at 154-55, 246 S.E.2d at 95.
5. On these two issues it has been said: "The two elements must co-exist. They must
be concurrent and simultaneous. One without the other will not sustain an award; yet the
1
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On the first issue, the court stated: "Accidents [arise] out
of the employment either if the risk of assault is increased be-
cause of the nature or setting of the work, or if the reason for the
assault was a quarrel having its origin in the work."' s In finding
that the injuries arose out of the employment, the court empha-
sized that this requirement refers to the origin of the cause of the
accident.
While the "arising out of" requirement is imposed to ensure
that a causal connection exists between the injury suffered and
the employment, the "in the course of" requirement is imposed
to ensure that a temporal and spatial relationship exists as well.7
Ostensibly, this means that the injury must occur during working
hours and at the place of employment in order to be compensable.
In Skipper, the court concluded that the injury did occur in the
course of Skipper's employment, even though the accident took
place after she had ceased working for the day and occurred out-
side the room in which she worked. The court noted:
The rule often recognized in workmen's compensation cases is
that an employee, to be entitled to compensation, need not be
in the actual performance of the duties for which he was ex-
pressly employed in order, for his injury or death to be in the
"course of employment", and thus compensable. It is sufficient
if the employee is engaged in a pursuit or undertaking consistent
with his contract of hire and which in some logical manner
pertains to or is incidental to his employment.'
Thus, a cessation from work does not immediately terminate
compensation coverage.' Indeed, it would be unnecessarily strict
if employees were not protected for a reasonable period of time
before and after working hours, and also for a reasonable distance
to and from the place of employment. After all, "[t]he employ-
ment contemplated [the employee's] entry upon and departure
two are so entwined that they are usually considered together in the reported cases; and
a discussion of one of them invokes the other." Eargle v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co.,
205 S.C. 423, 429, 32 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1944).
6. 271 S.C. at 157, 246 S.E.2d at 96 (quoting 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WOmRME'S
COMPENSATION § 11.00 (1976)).
7. "[T]he words 'in the course of employment,' have reference to the time, place and
circumstances under which the accident occurs." Eargle v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas
Co., 205 S.C. 423, 429, 32 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1944). See also S. HoRovrrz, supra note 1, at
154-73.
8. 271 S.C. at 156, 246 S.E.2d at 96 (emphasis added) (quoting Beam v. State Work-
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from the premises as much as it contemplated his working there,
and must include a reasonable interval of time for that pur-
pose."10
This practice of allowing coverage for reasonable extensions
of the time and place of employment is in accordance with the
workmen's compensation system's objective of providing broad-
ened coverage for work-related injuries" and the South Carolina
Supreme Court's policy of construing the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act 12 liberally to give effect to its remedial purposes. 13 In the
past, as in Skipper, the court resolved statutory ambiguity in
favor of the claimant.
4
B. The Special Errand Doctrine
As a general rule, an employee who is going to or coming from
the place of his employment is not discharging any service grow-
ing out of or incidental to his employment. Therefore, an injury
suffered by the employee while traveling to or from work is not
considered to arise out of and in the course of his employment. 5
To alleviate the harshness of this "going and coming" rule, the
South Carolina courts have long recognized several exceptions.
10. Cudhay Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 426 (1923) (citations omitted).
11. See 81 AM. JuR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 2 (1976).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-40 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
13. E.g., Moore v. Family Serv. of Charleston County, 269 S.C. 275, 237 S.E.2d 84
(1977); Carter v. Penny Tire and Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 200 S.E.2d 64 (1973);
Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 190 S.E.2d 751 (1972); Alewine v. Tobin
Quarries, Inc., 206 S.C. 103, 33 S.E.2d 81 (1945); Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E.2d 733 (1942). Cf. Singleton v. Young Lumber Co., 236 S.C. 454, 114
S.E.2d 837 (1960) (cannot construe the Act beyond the legislature's intent); Price v. B.F.
Shaw Co., 224 S.C. 89, 77 S.E.2d 491 (1953) (the Act should not be construed so as to
make it a form of insurance); Teigue v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878 (1952)
(should not construe the Act so as to do violence to one of its specific requirements).
14. E.g., Baldwin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 234 S.C. 320, 108 S.E.2d 409 (1959);
Cokely v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 14 S.E.2d 889 (1941).
15. E.g., Daniels v. Roumillat, 264 S.C. 497, 501, 216 S.E.2d 174, 176 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Gallman v. Spring Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715 (1942).
[We [have] recognized the following exceptions to the [going and coming]
rule: (1) Where, in going to and returning from work, the means of transporta-
tion is provided by the employer, or the time that is consumed is paid for or
included in the wages; (2) where the employee, on his way to or from his work,
is still charged with some duty or'task in connection with his employment.
[A] third exception to the general rule. . . is . . . "[w]here the way
used is the sole and exclusive way of ingress and egress, or where the way of
ingress or egress is constructed and maintained by the employer." And the
qualification was added to it that an injury would not be compensable unless
there be some inherent danger in the use of such exclusive street or way.
3
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One exception adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court is
known as the "special errand doctrine." 7 Justice Gregory has
noted:
The underlying basis of the "special errand" doctrine is that the
general rule excluding injuries incurred during the trip to or
from work should not apply if the journey to or from work was
part of the special errand or mission for the employer or if the
journey itself was a substantial part of the service for which the
worker was employed.'"
This doctrine can be easily stated, but perhaps because of its
novelty in South Carolina law, confusion remains regarding how
it is to be applied. Two cases involving this doctrine were decided
by the supreme court in 1978.11
In Gregg v. Dorchester County School System,"0 the special
errand doctrine was found inapplicable and compensation bene-
fits were denied. The claimant, Gregg, was an assistant principal
at a high school; his work day normally ended at 6:00 p.m. His
employment required, however, that, when requested, he attend
and help maintain order at the high school's football games,
which were held at night. As Gregg was driving home from one
such game, he was injured in an automobile accident when a
horse darted onto the highway. The court applied the going and
coming rule and determined that the injury did not arise out of
and in the course of his employment since the accident occurred
while Gregg was on his way home from work and away from the
premises of his employment. Furthermore, the special errand ex-
ception was held inapplicable essentially because there was noth-
ing "special" about the plaintiff's trip from the football game to
his home. The court emphasized that attendance at football
games was a "normal" aspect of Gregg's duties as assistant prin-
cipal,2 and that he was injured during his "normal" trip home
Eargle v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co., 205 S.C. 423, 431, 32 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1944)
(citing and quoting in part Gallman v. Spring Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715 (1942)).
17. Bickley v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co., 259 S.C. 463, 192 S.E.2d 866 (1972).
18. McDaniel v. Bus Terminal Restaurant Mgmt. Corp., 271 S.C. 299-302, 247 S.E.2d
321, 322 (1978) (citing Gregg v. Dorchester County School Sys., 270 S.C. 189, 192, 241
S.E.2d 554, 555 (1978)).
19. McDaniel v. Bus Terminal Restaurant Mgmt. Corp., 271 S.C. 299, 247 S.E.2d 321
(1978); Gregg v. Dorchester County School Sys., 270 S.C. 189, 241 S.E.2d 554 (1978).
20. 270 S.C. 189, 241 S.E.2d 554 (1978).
21. Id. at 193, 241 S.E.2d at 556.
[Vol. 31
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after the completion of the duties of his job.22 Moreover, in mak-
ing the trip he was not performing any service for his employer.2 3
Similarly, in McDaniel v. Bus Terminal Restaurant Manage-
ment Corp.,24 the going and coming rule overshadowed the special
errand doctrine and the claimant's injuries were deemed not to
have arisen out of and in the course of her employment. The
claimant, McDaniel, was employed at a restaurant as a cook. A
mandatory meeting of all restaurant employees was scheduled to
discuss work procedures and customer service. McDaniel was not
scheduled to work on the day of the meeting but she made a
special trip to attend. The meeting lasted less than an hour and
all employees were paid for their attendance. On the return trip
home McDaniel was injured in an automobile accident. In deny-
ing her workmen's compensation benefits, the court stated:
Ms. McDaniel was notified of the November 5 meeting in
advance. She was not called out by her employer to perform an
emergency service. She performed no service to her employer
while enroute to or from her place of employment and the trip
itself was not a substantial part of the service for which she was
employed. Meetings of this type had been held in the past and
were not unusual or "special." Attendance at these meetings
was a normal, customary aspect of Ms. McDaniel's job and she
did not perform a special errand by attending the meeting
25
Moreover, the court noted that the meeting was held at the nor-
mal place of employment and that McDaniel had traveled to and
from the meeting by her normal mode of transportation. As in
Gregg, the court in McDaniel placed emphasis on the normalcy
of the function attended and the trip made.
Gregg and McDaniel suggest that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, in considering the applicability of the special er-
rand doctrine as an exception to the going and coming rule, will
require not only that the employee be injured while performing
an "errand," that is, either performing a service for the employer
while enroute to or from the place of employment, or making a
trip that is a substantial part of the service for which he was
employed; but also, the court will require that this errand be
22. Id. 241 S.E.2d at 555.
23. Id.
24. 271 S.C. 299, 247 S.E.2d 321 (1978).
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"special." Although the court provided no precise definition of
"special" in this context, it appears that a meeting or function is
not special if: (1) the employee is given advance notice of the
function and his required attendance; (2) such functions are not
unusual and have been held in the past; (3) attendance at the
function is a normal, customary aspect of the employee's job;
and (4) the function was not called as the result of an emergency
situation.
I1. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
A. Loss of Consortium
In Lowery v. Wade Hampton Co.,26 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the
state's workmen's compensation laws 7 barred a husband's inde-
pendent cause of action for loss of consortium against his wife's
employer. In so holding, the court may have strained logic and
the normal rules of statutory construction, but the result reached
is clearly just and within the traditional policies of the workmen's
compensation system.
On its face, the exclusive remedy provision of the South Car-
olina Workmen's Compensation Act does not expressly bar a
spouse from bringing a loss of consortium action against the in-
jured spouse's employer. The Act merely states that the accept-
ance of compensation benefits by the injured employee "shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his per-
sonal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin," as
against the employer.2 Therefore, if this provision is to bar loss
of consortium suits, a spouse must fall within the definition of
either "next of kin" or "dependent."
The present South Carolina Code of Laws does not define
"next of kin," 2 but this phrase usually encompasses only those
26. 270 S.C. 194, 241 S.E.2d 556 (1978).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (1976).
28. Id. Section 42-1-540 provides in relevant part:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and
accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representa-
tive, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law
or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
29. The original Act defined "next of kin," or persons to receive benefits in the event
of no dependents, as "father, mother, widow, child, brother, and sister." 1936 S.C. Acts
[Vol. 31
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who are blood relatives.3 Given this interpretation of the phrase
as exclusory of a spouse, the expression as used in the exclusive
remedy section does not include spouses or preclude loss of con-
sortium suits. Whether or not a spouse is a "dependent" is a
factual determination,3 unless the employee died as a result of
his injuries, in which case the surviving spouse is conclusively
presumed to be a dependent. 32 Based on this argument, the hus-
band in Lowery contended that since "spouse" was not specifi-
cally listed or included in these definitions, a spouse's indepen-
dent cause of action for loss of consortium was outside the scope
of the exclusive remedy provision.
The court simply refused to accept this strict interpretation
of the statute, noting:
[T]he cases with near unanimity have barred suits by hus-
bands for loss of consortium .... The principal justification
for all these decisions usually lies in the explicit wording of the
clause barring any noncompensation liability for damages on
account of the injury or death. Even without the additional
precaution of a list of third persons barred, the sweeping lan-
guage used in describing the employer's immunity seems to in-
dicate a legislative intention that is accurately reflected in the
majority rule. 3
In reaching its decision that loss of consortium suits are not allow-
able under the South Carolina workmen's compensation system,
the court placed emphasis on two factors: (1) the majority rule
bars these suits; and (2) the legislature's use of broad language
in describing the employer's immunity indicates that spouses
come within its terms.
The overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdic-
tions is against allowing loss of consortium suits when the injured
spouse has accepted compensation coverage. 34 Unlike South Car-
1231, 1252. In 1972 the Second Injury Fund was created and all mention and definition of
"next of kin" was deleted from the section. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-165 (1962 & Cum. Supp.
1975) (current version at id. § 42-9-140 (1976)).
30. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 296 (1953).
31. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-120 (1976).
32. Id. § 42-9-110.
33. 270 S.C. at 198, 241 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting 2 A. LAsoN, supra note 6, § 66.20
(1976)).
34. See, e.g., England v. Dana Corp., 428 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1970) (Indiana law);
Lunow v. Fairchance Lumber Co., 389 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1968) (Oklahoma law); Posegate




Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
olina, however, many other states have statutory exclusive rem-
edy provisions that expressly include spouses.35 Additionally,
some foreign courts, in barring the action, have described the loss
of consortium action as being derivative36 or dependent.37 In
South Carolina, however, this action has been described as being
independent." This difference in characterization of the loss of
consortium action" could mean that the reasoning of other courts
would not apply in this state. Some courts, however, have main-
tained that the independent nature of the cause of action should
make no difference."
The court in Lowery attached great significance to the broad
language of the statute in concluding that spouses were meant to
be included within the prohibitions of the statute's exclusive rem-
edy provision.4' This approach ignores the rule of statutory con-
struction expressio unius est exclusio alteius,4 2 which provides
the assumption that a statute means exactly what it says and no
more. Arguably, if the General Assembly had meant to include
spouses in the list of those excluded from bringing an action
against an employer, then it would have listed spouses along with
next of kin and dependents. By negative implication the failure
to mention spouses is deemed intentional.
Although the court's reliance on these two factors may be
questionable, it is apparently justifiable in view of the court's
chief concern: "To allow a common law recovery for loss of con-
sortium merely because such is not expressly mentioned in the
body of the . . .Act, would make the liability of the employer
uncertain and indeterminate."43 As part of the quid pro quo for
ployee's Compensation Act); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th
Cir. 1960) (Louisiana law); Heacker v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 270 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.
1959) (Texas law); Thomas v. Central Linen Co., 263 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
35. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-414(a) and (b) (1973).
36. E.g., Arthur v. Arthur, 156 Ind. App. 405, 296 N.E.2d 912 (1973).
37. See Bloemer v. Square D Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 371, 290 N.E.2d 699 (1972).
38. See Crowder v. Carroll, 251 S.C. 192, 161 S.E.2d 235 (1968).
39. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (4th ed. 1971).
40. E.g., Smither and Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
914 (1957); Newman v. Gibraltar Coal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky.), affl'd, 471 F.2d
653 (6th Cir. 1972).
41. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
42. "[E]xpression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLAcK's LAw DrCToNARY
521 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Thus, when certain persons are specified in a statute, "an intention
to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred." Little v. Town of Conway, 171
S.C. 27, 31, 170 S.E. 447, 448 (1933).
43. 270 S.C. at 198-99, 241 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting Stainbrook v. Johnson County
[Vol. 31
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/13
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
liability without fault under the workmen's compensation sys-
tem, the employer's liability for accidental injuries arising out of
the employment is limited to the payment of compensation.4 In
return, the employee receives a swift and certain remedy uncom-
plicated by the common law defenses. 5 To allow a separate suit
against the employer by an injured employee's spouse would
erode one of the goals of workmen's compensation legislation,
which is to guarantee the employer that by coming under its
provisions he will be held liable for his employee's work-related
injuries only to the extent of the workmen's compensation bene-
fits.
B. Carrier's Lien
Under the workmen's compensation system, if the injury to
an employee results from the act of a third-party wrongdoer, the
employee still may be entitled to receive compensation benefits
from his employer. To relieve the employer of some of the burden
of paying these benefits, the workmen's compensation laws seek
to effect an equitable adjustment of the rights and liabilities of
the employee, the employer, and the third-party tortfeasor.46 This
adjustment is accomplished by assigning the injured employee's
right of action against the tortfeasor to the employer, or to the
employer's insurer. 7 The employer or his insurer, after paying
compensation benefits to the employee, can then proceed against
the culpable third party and attempt to recoup payments. 8 A
problem could arise, however, if the injured employee secretly
obtains a settlement with the third-party tortfeasor, and then
demands compensation benefits from his employer. On paying
these benefits, the employer would be assigned the rights of the
employee against the tortfeasor, but because of the secret settle-
ment, the employee would have no rights to assign. Conse-
quently, the employer would be left with no recourse against the
Farm Bureau, Coop Ass'n, 125 Ind. App. 487, 122 N.E.2d 884 (1954)).
44. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 65.10. See also Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230
S.C. 532, 545, 96 S.E.2d 566, 572-73 (1957); Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 416, 73 S.E.2d
449, 451 (1952).
45. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 65.10.
46. Id. § 73.22.
47. Fuller v. Southern Elec. Serv. Co., 200 S.C. 246, 252-53, 20 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1942).
48. Stroy v. Millwood Drug Store, Inc., 235 S.C. 52, 109 S.E.2d 706 (1959); Gardner
v. City of Columbia Police Dep't, 216 S.C. 219, 57 S.E.2d 308 (1950); Taylor v. Mount
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third-party wrongdoer. To protect the employer from this type of
conduct and its consequence, South Carolina's workmen's com-
pensation laws grant the employer's carrier a lien on the settle-
ment proceeds under certain circumstances if the settlement was
entered into without consent.49
The importance to the employee of involving the employer
in his settlement negotiations with the third party was recently
emphasized by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Rogers v.
Watkins Motor Lines, Inc.5" The employee, Rogers, was receiving
compensation benefits for an injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment. Rogers subsequently filed a tort action
in another state against the responsible third-party tortfeasor and
through this suit received a substantial settlement. 5' The em-
ployer's insurer sought to have a valid lien placed on the settle-
ment proceeds in the amount of the compensation benefits al-
ready paid. In granting this lien, the court cited South Carolina's
third-party liability provision, 52 which declares that when the
employee and the third party enter into a compromise settlement
without the written consent of the employer's insurer, "the settle-
ment shall be invalid as against the carrier, which shall be enti-
tled to maintain an action against the third party to recover the
amount of compensation for which the carrier is liable" 53 to the
employee. The court accepted the Commission's finding that the
employer and his carrier were entitled to reimbursement for the
benefits that they had already paid, because the settlement was
negotiated without the "knowledge, consent, or approval"54 of the
Industrial Commission.
III. COMPUTATION OF AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
In South Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, the amount of
payment an injured employee or his dependents can receive
under workmen's compensation depends upon the employee's
average weekly wages prior to his injury.55 The method for deter-
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (1976).
50. 270 S.C. 238, 241 S.E.2d 744 (1978).
51. The employer's insurer had already paid Rogers compensation benefits totaling
$1,734.26. The settlement that Rogers subsequently negotiated with the third party was
for $6,600. 270 S.C. at 240, 241 S.E.2d at 745.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
53. Id. § 42-1-560(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
54. 270 S.C. at 241, 241 S.E.2d at 745.
55. See S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1, at 262-67.
[Vol. 31
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mining the average weekly wage is defined by statute.56 Gener-
ally, if the injured employee had worked for an entire year imme-
diately before the accident, then his average weekly wage is his
salary for that one-year period divided by fifty-two.57 On the other
hand, if the injured employee had not worked for a full year prior
to his accident, then his average weekly wage is determined by
dividing the salary that he received during the periods that he
was employed by the number of weeks that he worked." Both of
these methods are subject to the general qualification that the
result reached must be "fair and just" to both the employee and
the employer.59
In Bennett v. Gary Smith Builders," I the claimant, Bennett,
worked as a carpenter for nearly eighteen years in the employ-
ment of Smith Builders. On reaching age sixty-two he quit work-
ing full time and began drawing Social Security. From his
"retirement" until thd time he received his injury, a period of
nine years, Bennett worked each year for Smith Builders until he
had earned the maximum amount he was allowed to make with-
out penalty and continued to receive full Social Security benefits.
This amounted to working three or four months a year and earn-
ing about $2,500 each year. Bennett received a compensable in-
jury while he was so employed. The issue presented to the su-
preme court concerned the amount of benefits to which he was
entitled.
Because Bennett worked less than fifty-two weeks a year, the
Industrial Commission determined his average weekly wage by
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-40 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
57. Id. Section 42-1-40, in relevant part, defines the term "average weekly wages" as
follows:
"Average weekly wages" shall mean earnings of the injured employee in the
employment in which he was working at the time of the injury during the period
of fifty-two weeks immediately preceeding the date of the injury, . . . divided
by fifty-two . . . . When the employment prior to the injury extended over a
period of less than fifty-two weeks, the method of dividing the earnings during
that period by the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee
earned wages shall be followed, provided results fair and just to both parties will
be thereby obtained ...
But when for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either to
the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly
wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which
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dividing the earnings during the period of employment by the
number of weeks worked. Using this method, the Commission
determined that Bennett was entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits that amounted to an annual payment that was al-
most twice as much as he had actually earned during any one of
the nine years since he had gone into semi-retirement."
The supreme court held that, under these circumstances,
this method df computing the average weekly wage was erro-
neous. When the injured employee has worked for a period of less
than a full year immediately prior to his injury, the average
weekly wage may be determined by dividing the earnings re-
ceived by the total number of weeks actually worked only if the
result reached is one that is "fair and just" to both of the parties.
2
Otherwise, the average weekly wage must be computed by a
method that "will most nearly approximate the amount which
the injured employee would be earning were it not for the in-
jury.
' 63
The court found that it would be "grossly unfair" to Smith
Builders to require it to pay Bennett nearly twice the amount that
he would have earned had no injury occurred. 4 It, therefore, de-
cided that Bennett was entitled to workmen's compensation ben-
efits based on an average weekly wage that would be computed
by utilizing the $2,500 amount that Bennett would have received
annually had he not been injured. In so doing, the court noted:
The objective of wage calculation is to arrive at a fair approxi-
mation of the claimant's probable future earning capacity. His
disability reaches into the future, not the past; his loss as a
result of injury must be thought of in terms of its impact on
probable future earnings. The calculation we hereby approve
brings about a result fair to the employee and to the employer.
It neither rewards the employee for working less than full time,
nor punishes the employer for having given [the employee]
61. The Commission by dividing "the earnings during the period of employment by
the number of weeks worked .. found Bennett's average weekly wage to be $151.48,
thereby making the compensable rate $91.17. At $151.48 per week, he would have earned
$7,876.96 in a full year of employment. Workmen's Compensation benefits at $91.17 per
week would amount to $4,740.84 per year. . ." Id. at 97-98, 245 S.E.2d at 131. Compare
this with the $2,500 that he would actually have earned each year if he had not been
injured.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-40 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
63. Id.
64. 271 S.C. at 98, 245 S.E.2d at 131.
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part-time employment after he declined full-time employ-
ment. 5
The court was careful to emphasize that the employee had
voluntarily withdrawn himself from his employment for the bal-
ance of the year, the normal average weekly wage calculation
period. The court stated:
[W]e have an employee who for reasons satisfactory to himself,
while fully capable of working, quit and withdrew his services
from the labor market except for three or four months in the
year. Disability has caused him to lose approximately $2,500.00
per year. Failure to receive any amount over and above that
figure in the past or future is not attributable to the injury he
sustained, but rather is attributable to the pattern of work ac-
tivity he has voluntarily assumed.66
Thus, when the employee is only working part time at the time
of his injury, and when the reason for working part time stems
from the employee's voluntary choice, based on reasons of his own
to withdraw himself from the labor market, then the average
weekly wage computation should reflect as nearly as possible th
amount that he would have earned had it not been for the injury.
But when the employee, at the time of his injury, is temporarily
working part time, not because of his desire to do so, but because
his employer, reacting to adverse economic factors, has directed
him to do so, then it would not be fair to tie the employee down
to his reduced annual income; rather, the average weekly wage
should be computed by dividing the earnings received during the
period of actual employment by the number of weeks worked."7
65. Id. at 98-99, 245 S.E.2d at 131-32.
66. Id. at 98, 245 S.E.2d at 131.
67. This has been suggested by one authority, using a partial week to illustrate:
Where, because of a depression, shortage of material or other reason, the em-
ployee is working only three days weekly, at $5 per day, whereas ordinarily he
worked six days and earned $30 weekly, many states take his actual earnings
($15 weekly), whereas others consider the normal week, or $30 weekly. The
difference to the worker is enormous. In one state he would receive $10 (two-
thirds of $15) weekly, in the other, $20. If the depression continued, he was
better off not to work in the $20 state, but if work picked up and his co-workers
began earning more than $30 weekly, the unfortunate injured worker still contin-
ued to draw only $10 in the narrower states.
Neither method is always just, yet the more equitable solution is to use the
higher wage schedule rather than the depressed wage, and guard carefully
against malingering.
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This approach is in accord with the workmen's compensation
program's objectives to provide substantial protection against
interruption of income, 8 and to compensate not only for the ac-
tual loss of wages but also for loss to the wage-earning capacity."
Additionally, it is clear in Bennett that the employee, if he
had not been injured, would have continued his pattern of main-
taining only a part-time connection with the labor market .7 The
significance of this factor becomes apparent from the following
example. Suppose that a young man, while finishing his last year
of school, is working only on weekends and suffers a compensable
injury that results in total permanent disability. To compensate
him for a lifetime on the basis of his part-time weekend earnings
would clearly not reflect the actual impairment of his future earn-
ing capacity.' Accordingly, it has been held that in such situa-
tions the compensation should be calculated as if the young man
were working full time, reflecting as nearly as possible the proba-
ble actual impairment to his wage-earning capacity.
2
Thus, in light of Bennett and general workmen's compensa-
tion law, a step-by-step approach can be utilized in ascertaining
the average weekly wage of an injured employee. The bottom line
test is that the result reached must be fair and just to both the
employee and the employer. This result is obtained only when the
compensation awarded approximates, as nearly as possible, the
employee's probable future earning capacity. When the em-
ployee, at the time of his injury, has been working only part time
his average weekly wage may be determined by either of two
methods: (1) the earnings that he received over the year immedi-
ately prior to the accident may be divided by fifty-two, with a
relatively low average weekly wage as a result; or, (2) the earnings
that he received over the year immediately preceeding his acci-
dent may be divided by the number of weeks that he actually
worked, with a relatively high average weekly wage as a result.
Which method should be used in turn depends on two factors: (1)
whether the injured employee was working part time voluntarily;
68. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 18-19, 35, 36-38 (1972).
69. Id. at 137.
70. Mr. Bennett was over seventy-years old at the time of his accident and drawing
Social Security benefits. 271 S.C. at 96, 245 S.E.2d at 130.
71. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, §§ 60.20-.22.
72. See Perrin v. Tanner Grocery Co., 46 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1950); Ferch v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 208 Minn. 9, 292 N.W. 424 (1940).
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and (2) whether there is reason to expect that the pattern of part-
time employment will continue indefinitely into the future. The
part-time work pattern is involuntary when the employee is
forced into it, whether because of general adverse economic con-
ditions,73 a temporary sickness or disability,74 or the simple refusal
of employers to hire him full time.75 Only if the part-time work
pattern was voluntarily assumed and likely to continue into the
future should the lower average weekly wage method be used. If
either one of the above factors is not present, then, absent special
circumstances, the higher average weekly wage computation
method should be employed.
IV. ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
If death is the result of a work-related injury that falls within
the scope of workmen's compensation coverage, then it is neces-
sary that the claim for benefits be filed with the Industrial Com-
mission within one year from the date of the accident or else the
right to compensation shall be forever barred. 6 In Robertson v.
Brissey's Garage, Inc.77 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the workmen's compensation carrier was estopped to assert
the statute of limitations against the claimant, when the carrier's
conduct unintentionally misled the claimant, and when the
claimant's failure to timely file her claim was a reasonable result
of the carrier's conduct, even though such conduct was purely
gratuitous.
Mr. Brissey suffered a fatal injury while working at his ga-
rage and a compensation claim was brought by his widow. The
insurance carrier argued that because Mr. Brissey had been presi-
dent and part owner of the garage, he was not an employee under
the Workmen's Compensation Act 8 and his death therefore was
not compensable. The carrier informed the widow, Mrs. Brissey,
of its position, and in reliance on this, she failed to file a timely
claim.
In holding that this conduct estopped the carrier from assert-
ing the statute of limitations against the claimant, the court ad-
73. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 60.21.
74. See Krogman v. Krogman Filter Co., 89 N.J. Super. 16, 213 A.2d 256 (1965).
75. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 60.21.
76. S.C. CODF ANN. § 42-15-40 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
77. 270 S.C. 58, 240 S.E.2d 810 (1978).
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dressed itself to two subissues, both of which it answered affirma-
tively: (1) did the carrier by its conduct mislead the claimant;
and, (2) was the reliance by the claimant on the acts or represen-
tations of the carrier reasonable or justified? The question re-
quires that a causal connection exist between the carrier's con-
duct and the failure of the claimant to file a timely claim. It was
immaterial that the carrier acted in good faith, without an intent
to mislead, so long as its conduct actually had that effect."9 Nei-
ther did it make any difference that the carrier was under no
obligation to act but rather was rendering a gratuitous service."
The first subissue requires that there be actual reliance; the
second one requires that this reliance be justified. Of extreme
importance in answering both questions is the relative disparity
of the knowledge and experience between the claimant and the
carrier with respect to the Workmen's Compensation Act. When
the carrier occupies a position far superior to the claimant, it
would normally be reasonable for the claimant to consider it fu-
tile to assert a claim for workmen's compensation benefits in view
of the positive assertions by the carrier that the injury or death
is not compensable. 1
In light of this case, a workmen's compensation insurance
carrier would be well advised to use care in informing a potential
claimant that the injury suffered by the employee is not compens-
able. Indeed, it is difficult, under the court's reasoning, to imag-
ine a case in which the claimant, unless he is a sophisticated
businessman, would not be justified in relying upon the carrier's
position that the injury falls outside the scope of compensation
coverage. In order to avoid being estopped from asserting the
statutory limitation should the claimant later file an untimely
claim, the cautious carrier, in addition to informing the claimant
of its position, would be well advised to also: (1) explain to the
claimant that the carrier's opinion is nothing more than an opin-
ion and is not binding on the Insurance Commission; (2) explain
to the claimant that it is the Insurance Commission that makes
the decision whether or not an injury is compensable, and not the
carrier; (3) explain to the claimant that he and the carrier are in
adverse positions, that is, that any compensation found owing
79. Id. at 64, 240 S.E.2d at 812. Young v. Sonoco Prod. Co., 210 S.C. 146, 156, 41
S.E.2d 860, 864 (1947).
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will have to come from the carrier's pocket; and, (4) briefly out-
line to the claimant the preliminary procedures for filing his
claim, emphasizing any time limitations. Moreover, it is essential
that this be done in good faith. If the above factors are explained
to the claimant, he may still rely on the carrier's opinion and fail
to file a timely claim, but it is extremely doubtful that his reli-
ance would be justified, for no longer would an imbalance in
knowledge exist between the parties concerning the Act and its
coverage.
V. 1978 LEGISLATIvE AMENDMENTS
A. Recovery Ceiling Removed. In many instances in the
past, the $40,000 ceiling meant that compensation was not the
choice method of recovery since many cases could possibly result
in larger awards at the hands of a jury.8 2 Effective May 19, 1978,
this drawback to a claimant's recovery was alleviated by the elim-
ination of the $40,000 maximum permissible recovery. 3
[A]n employee can now collect 66 and 2/3 percent of his aver-
age weekly wage for 500 weeks, without regard to a limitation
or a cap, other than as set by the Employment Security Com-
mission the preceding year. In substance, a total disability
claim is now worth in excess of $80,000.00, assuming the individ-
ual's average weekly wage is high enough to obtain the maxi-
mum .84
B. Carrier's Lien In Third-Party Actions. When an injured
employee has received workmen's compensation benefits from his
employer's carrier and subsequently, in a separate suit, recovers
damages from a third party, the carrier is entitled to a lien
against these proceeds to the extent of benefits already paid. 5 By
amendment this year, a provision has been added that calls for a
proportionate reduction in the amount of a carrier's lien in this
type of third-party action when the employee did not receive
adequate total damages in the third-party action. 6
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100 (1976).
83. Id. § 42-9-100 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
84. SOUTH CAROLINA TRIAL LAWYERS AsSOCIATION, THE BULLEIN 9 (Nov./Dec. 1978).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560 (1976).
86. Id. § 42-1-560(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978), which provides in part:
Notwithstanding other provisions of this item, where an employee or his
representative enters into a settlement with or obtains a judgment upon trial




Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
C. "Filing Claim For Occupational Disease. The filing of a
workmen's compensation claim must be made within two years
from the date of the accident or else the right to compensation is
barred.8" With the normal work-related accident this requirement
causes little problem, since the date of the accident can be easily
determined and the injured employee is immediately and pain-
fully aware of his injury. Occupational diseases, however, pose a
problem because there is no definable "date of the accident."
Because no "accident," in the ordinary meaning of the word,
occurs, the injured employee may not be aware of his "injury"
until a considerable period of time has elapsed since he con-
tracted it. Recognizing this, the South Carolina Code of Laws now
provides that in the case of an occupational disease the two-year
statutory period does not begin to run on the date of the accident
as with other injuries. Instead, the limitations period begins to
run only after the occupational disease has been definitely diag-
nosed and the affected employee has been notified."
D. Hearing Attendance. New amendments have given the
Industrial Commission some bite to its bark. Failure to comply
with the terms of the Commission's subpoena or disorderly con-
duct at a hearing may now subject the offender to the Commis-
sion's power to cite and punish for contempt. Moreover, a refusal
to attend a hearing, testify or produce records has been character-
ized as a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine or imprisonment up
to thirty days."5
H. Fred Kuhn, Jr.
mated total damages, the commission may reduce the amount of the carrier's
lien on the proceeds of such settlement in the proportion that such settlement
or judgment bears to the commission's evaluation of the employee's total cogniz-
able damages at law. Any such reduction shall be based on a determination by
the commission that such reduction would be equitable to all parties concerned
and serve the interests of justice.
87. Id. § 42-15-40 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
88. Id. This section states in relevant part: "[I]n the case of occupational disease
claims such two-year period shall not begin to run until the employee concerned has been
definitively diagnosed as having an occupational disease and has been notified of such
diagnosis." Id.
89. Id. § 42-3-150 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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